The impact of borrowing constraints on homeownership has been well established in the literature. Wealth is most likely to restrict homeownership followed by credit and income. Using recent movers from the 1979 National Longitudinal Survey of Youth and borrowing constraint definitions commonly used in the literature, we examine the impact of these constraints on the probability of homeownership during the housing market boom between 2003 and 2007. We show that whereas the pool of financially constrained households expanded, the marginal impact of borrowing constraints associated with income and credit quality declined during this period. The constraint associated with wealth, however, continued to have a negative impact on homeownership status, all else equal. The fact that lending standards became less strict is accepted; however the impact of this on homeownership has not been previously studied. Here we find that less restrictive underwriting does appear to have reduced the impact of income and credit quality on homeownership but the impact of the wealth constraint persists. 
Introduction
An extensive literature studying financial barriers to homeownership has developed over the past two decades. This line of research provides ample evidence that down payment and monthly payment requirements, which respectively depend on the household's wealth and income, traditionally have been a factor in tenure status. The research also documents the impact of borrowers' credit quality, a determinant of access to mortgage credit, on tenure status. A second line of research, theoretical and empirical, demonstrates both that loosened mortgage underwriting helped fuel the boom in house prices between 2003 and 2007and the boom in house prices supported the credit expansion.
What the literature does not identify is the effect of this credit expansion on borrowing constraints, and the effect of changing borrowing constraints on homeownership. In fact, homeownership did not expand after 2004 despite the expansion of credit supply and loosening of traditional credit constraints. Our paper contributes to the literature by being the first to measure the changes in borrowing constraints during the 2003 to 2007 period of rapidly rising house values, and the associated impacts on homeownership. We also consider the relationship of changing borrowing constraints to regional house price appreciation. 5 We use data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY) which is comprised of households headed by persons in their 40s, excluding immigrants. As a relatively homogeneous demographic group, these households provide a controlled sample for studying the impact of the evolving housing and credit environment. The survey provides information on the homeownership status and current house values, as well as income, wealth and credit quality of households that allows us to identify those that face potential income, wealth or credit constraints. Within this sample, we focus on households that have recently moved, because these households face an actual tenure choice decision. The timing of the survey provides two important snapshots bounding the boom period: we use the 2004 and 2008 data which reflects tenure choices among households that moved during 2002-2003 and 2006-2007, respectively. Consistent with prior studies, the three constraint categories of income, wealth, and credit history are found to be associated with reduced likelihood of homeownership among the recent movers in the first wave of the survey. Importantly, however, although the pool of financially constrained households increased during the boom period, as reflected in 5 See "Explaining the Housing Bubble" (Levitin and Wachter, 2012) for a discussion of the timing of the housing bubble as it relates to real estate fundamentals in particular as it relates to rents and interest rates.
comparison across the two snapshots, the marginal impact of borrowing constraints, other than the wealth constraint, declined.
The paper is organized as follows: The next section reviews the relevant literature, section three discusses the data, and section four outlines the methodology. Section five discusses the results, and section six concludes.
Literature Review
As noted, our paper builds on the well-established literature that documents a significant role of borrowing constraints as a factor in homeownership status, especially among lowincome and minority households. For instance, Haurin et al. (1996 Haurin et al. ( , 1997 demonstrates that the wealth constraint plays an important role, even after taking into account the endogeneity of wealth in tenure decisions. 6 The earlier literature examines wealth and income constraints but does not consider the role of borrowing constraints tied to household credit quality. Rosenthal (2002) introduces credit quality in investigating barriers to homeownership by considering the combined impact of all three types of borrowing constraints using the 1998 Survey of Consumer Finance. Barakova et al. (2003) confirms the importance of credit quality and evaluates the relative impact of credit quality on homeownership rates, distinguishing it from wealth and income constraints. The current study extends Calem et al. (2010) , which uses information on wealth, income, and credit in the 2004 wave of the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY) to demonstrate the effect of wealth, income and credit constraints in accessing homeownership status. This paper also relates to the recent and expanding literature that considers the relationship of collateral values to house price dynamics. Demyanyk and Van Hemert (2009) argue that less restrictive underwriting standards prior to the mortgage crisis could have been detected but were masked by rapid house-price appreciation. Pavlov and Wachter (2011) investigate the relationship between riskier, mortgage lending instruments with less restrictive underwriting standards and asset market prices and find that the expansion of credit supply through these instruments increases asset prices and magnifies the effects of demand shocks.
Like Pavlov and Wachter (2011), Adelino et al. (2011) agree that higher credit supply induces an increase in asset prices. In particular, they reject the notion that an increase in housing demand loosens financial constraints. On the other hand, Brueckner et al. (2012) find 6 The study arrived at similar findings with and without endogenizing wealth. Similarly, Calem, Firestone, and Wachter (2010) consider potential endogeneity of wealth and income in a study of the impact of financing constraints using NLSY data, and determine the findings to be robust to using instruments.
feedback effects between expectations of rising house prices and less restrictive mortgage underwriting. Coleman et al. (2008) also find that the expansion of credit is a result of the rise in house prices during the boom period.
Another line of investigation uses structural vector error correction models to determine whether mortgage expansion Granger-causes price rises or whether price rises Grangercauses an expansion in mortgage credit in the US and elsewhere. The findings generally support bidirectional causality. (See Anundsen & Jansen 2012; Berlinghieri, 2010; Oikarinen, 2009a; Oikarinen, 2009b; Sophocles & Vlassopoulos, 2009; Fitzpatrick & McQuinn, 2007; Gerlach & Peng, 2005; Gimeno & Martinez-Carrascal, 2010; Hoffman, 2004; Hoffman, 2003.) A related question the literature addresses is whether the rise in house prices is associated with greater reliance on risk-based pricing allowing for lower credit scores, and low-or nodocumentation (low-, no-doc) mortgages (see Getter, 2011 ). The argument is that when collateral (house) values are rising, lenders do not need to verify income to underwrite a loan but rather can rely primarily on credit scores and price the loan according to the riskiness of the borrower. Based on this analysis, wealth, income and credit constraints reduce the probability of homeownership when house prices do not increase, but when they do increase, risk-based pricing (with the assumption that house values will continue to rise) makes these constraints non-binding. 7 Our empirical tests allow us to identify whether this applies generally and also for each constraint, separately.
Our paper contributes to both the literature on financing constraints and the research on linkages between credit supply and house prices during the boom. First, the paper documents the impact of the change in borrowing constraints on homeownership in this unusual period.
Second, quantifying the impact of borrowing constraints during the boom period helps explain the linkages between credit supply and collateral values.
Data
We use data from the 1979 National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY) to study the 7 This is consistent with practices documented in the Federal Reserve interagency guidance on Nontraditional Mortgage Product Risks (Sept. 29, 2006) , Final Rule amending Regulation Z (July 14, 2008) .The result, according to Getter (2011) , is that no-doc lending makes it possible to follow a lifecycle consumption pattern where income is no longer tied to consumption, consistent with the literature on credit constraints to consumption (Zeldes, 1989; Campbell and Cocco, 2003) . This possible relationship between house borrowing constraints and consumer welfare outcome is discussed in theoretical general equilibrium models (see Favilukis et al., 2010) ; see also "Why Housing" (Levitin and Wachter, 2013) Table 2 also provides the same set of summary statistics for the full survey data of over 7,000 observations in both years. The statistics are similar to those reported for the recent mover samples, but non-movers are more likely to be married, to have children at home, to have a larger family size and higher average house value and wealth.
Two measures of local housing market conditions are used in this study. We measure local house price appreciation rates using the FHFA all-transactions house price index at the MSA level, or the index for the non-MSA part of the states for households residing outside
MSAs. 12 We also use a value-to-rent ratio based on American Community Survey median house value and median gross rent for the MSA or state in which the respondent resides. We do however use the SCF data to replicate our tests to the extent possible. Similarly, the American Housing Survey contains representative homeownership data but lacks information on wealth. 11 The aging of the NLSY population is unlikely a factor influencing this decline in the homeownership rate, because across households in the sample age has a slight positive correlation with likelihood of ownership in the NLSY sample (4.5% in 2003 and 2% in 2007) . 12 We use the FHFA all-transactions house price index, which is based on sales as well as appraisals for refinance. The reason is that the purchase-only index is available only for the 100 largest MSAs and at state level, whereas the all-transaction is available for all MSAs as well as for non-MSA parts of the states. Results were found to be robust to substituting the purchase-only index where available. 
Methodology
Following an established methodology in the literature, we jointly estimate a (first-stage) selection equation identifying homeowner households that are not subject to borrowing constraints, and a (second-stage) housing demand equation indicating the preferred home value of these unconstrained, owner households. We then apply the estimated, target home value equation to the entire (renter and owner) recent mover population to distinguish borrowing constrained households. In essence, this approach assumes that a household that is relocating and considering ownership, if not financing constrained, would demand the same value home as a similarly situated, unconstrained owner household in the general population.
Three conditions must be satisfied for a household to be considered unconstrained. First, their wealth must exceed 5% of their targeted house value, implying an ability to make a 5 percent down payment. Second, the mortgage payment associated with borrowing 95 percent of the targeted house value, given the prevailing market interest rate 13 for a fixed-rate mortgage plus the typical premium for private mortgage insurance, must not exceed 28% of their monthly income, implying ability to meet the traditional, standard requirement for prime mortgage credit. We also consider alternative thresholds of higher down payment and payment-to-income ratios for robustness including 10% down payment and 33% payment-toincome. Third, they must have favorable credit records with respect to having none of the following risk indicators: a credit line that is fully drawn, a credit request refusal in the last 5 years, or bankruptcy in the last 9 years; and they are not "thin file", meaning they have current or previous credit utilization. These are important indicators of consumer credit risk and major components of the consumer's credit score, which is driven by length of credit history, past delinquencies, amount owed and utilization. 14 Note that although we do not have actual mortgage terms in the data, the intention of defining constraints under traditional standards is to capture whether alternative products and risk based pricing have relaxed the traditional constraints, that is, whether the probability of homeownership has increased and the impact of the traditional constraints has lessened with the growth of alternative products and risk based pricing. homeowners and relates a household's home value to household income, demographic variables, and geographic location. 15 Unconstrained homeowners are those whose home value, wealth, and income satisfy the specified thresholds, and who have good credit. As membership in this group is not a random event, we control for sample selection by applying the Heckman two-step selection equation. Accordingly, we first estimate an equation for probability of being an unconstrained homeowner, from which we obtain an adjustment for sample selection that is applied in our housing demand equation.
We follow Calem et al. (2010) in constructing the specification for the jointly estimated selection model and unconstrained housing demand model, equations (1). The same variables are used in both equations since we did not find predictors of unconstrained homeowners not related to the house value.
16
(1)
After applying the estimated housing demand equation to distinguish constrained from unconstrained households for the full population of owners and renters, we estimate a probit model of homeownership likelihood in relation to the borrowing constraints, equation (2). As noted earlier, the probit model estimation is restricted to households that were recent movers, as their tenure decision is a direct outcome of the move.
Controls include race, marital status, whether the respondent has children, and the respondent's education level.
The models are estimated for both 2003 and 2007 in order to assess changes associated with the housing market boom during the interim period. In addition to exploring the direct relationship between homeownership outcomes and borrowing constraints at the beginning 15 US Census region is the most disaggregated geographic information generally available to the public from the NLSY data. For this study, we obtained access to the confidential MSA-level geographic identifier; such access is granted to academic institutions subject to certain qualifications. 16 See, for example, Haurin, Hendershott, and Wachter (1996) for discussion of the bivariate probit model in a housing demand and tenure choice context. With bivariate probit, identification is possible even with a common set of explanatory variables due to the non-linearity of the probit model. 
Results
We first report the results, in Table 3 , from the two-equation model (1) The same set of variables is used in the house price and the unconstrained household selection equations, as in Calem et al. (2010) . Some demographic variables that were used are not reported in Table 3 for the sake of brevity, as they were not statistically significant in either equation. 18 We find that the impact of marital status on preferred house value is more weakly negative (estimated coefficient of -0.14) and offset by the relationship to household size when the housing demand equation is estimated for the full homeowner population (both financially constrained and unconstrained.) A possible explanation for the large, negative relationship of married status for unconstrained households is that unmarried households in this age cohort have a strong preference for residing in central city locations.
traditional measures. 19 We note a high correlation between the income and wealth constraints of close to 40% and only around 10% correlation between being credit constrained and each of the other two.
The substantial increase in the proportion of recent movers that are wealth and income constrained using traditional measures is likely tied to the rise in house prices in this period.
That rising prices will cause income constraints to be more binding on a household seeking to relocate is clear; however, the impact on wealth constraints is more nuanced. Whereas house price appreciation provides a wealth benefit to homeowners seeking to relocate from areas with rapidly increasing prices to those with slower price appreciation, those relocating in the other direction will be increasingly wealth constrained according to the traditional criterion.
Likewise, owners seeking to "trade-up" into a higher-priced home, along with renters, may increasingly be wealth constrained as a result of rising house prices. Thus, a plausible explanation for the increase in proportion of wealth constrained households among recent movers is that the latter effects of rising prices were predominant. Note that less restrictive underwriting would not affect the proportion constrained by these measures, which assume traditional underwriting. However, less restrictive underwriting should be reflected in a weaker impact of the financing constraints on homeownership in the estimation of the probit model.
a. Probit Model
Tables 5 and 6 report the estimation results for probability of homeownership in relation to the three borrowing constraint indicators. Table 5 provides estimated coefficients and standard errors and Table 6 reports the marginal effects corresponding to the results in Table   5 , for four specifications. Model A1 (column 1) omits the housing market variables, while models A2 and A3 (columns 2 and 3) include the change in HPI and the value-to-rent ratio respectively and model A4 include both variables (column 4).
Across all four specifications, we see a substantial decrease in the effect of income and 19 The percent non-constrained, although higher for homeowners in both years, decreases more for owners than for renters.
The weakened impact of credit constraints is consistent with less restrictive underwriting that broadened availability of credit to borrowers with weaker credit records, and thus is consistent with expansion of subprime lending during this period. Subprime credit also may have contributed to weakened income constraints by de-emphasizing traditional payment-toincome ratio requirements. In addition, the weakened impact of income constraints is consistent with expanded supply of non-traditional products that offered deferred repayment of principal or interest, including interest only mortgages, pay-option adjustable rate mortgages, and ARMs with introductory "teaser" interest rates.
The persistent impact of wealth constraints is somewhat unexpected given the growth in high-LTV borrowing during this period in the form of simultaneous first and second liens ("piggyback loans"), as documented by Canner (2006, 2007) Other variables included in the regressions as controls also show shifting coefficients across these two periods. Of greatest interest perhaps are the rising negative coefficients for minority status. Over this period minorities become less likely to choose homeownership, all else equal. This may be due to omitted variables in the measurement of constraints across race and ethnicity, magnified by rising house prices.
We estimate the tenure choice equation for both years with interactions of the constraint variables with an indicator for African-American households and we separately estimate the tenure choice equation for African-American households. We do not observe any material differences in the impact of constraints across race categories over time. However, the coefficient on the wealth constraint variable is larger for both years for African-American households.
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20 We also replicated the base model using SCF data. Without geography we find it is difficult to
b. Model Extensions
We re-estimate these equations under a variety of alternative assumptions. We begin by varying the down payment and payment-to-income ratios that respectively define the wealth and income constraints in Table 7 . The results are robust to alternative, a wealth constraint threshold of 10 percent down payment. The results are also robust to an alternative income constraint threshold of 30 and 33 percent payment-to-income ratios.
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We also combine all three of our constraints and compare the response of recent movers to whether they are constrained by any of the three between 2003 and 2007. These results are shown in Table 8 for three specifications. We find that the status of being constrained by any of the measured constraints decreases the probability of homeownership in both periods, and, although the coefficient on the constraint decreases in size, this decline is not statistically significant. Results are robust to alternative models with interactions on the constraint.
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In addition, because preferences and other unobserved factors may vary significantly between recent movers that were previously owners and those that were previously renters,
we repeat the baseline analysis separately for these two cohorts. Results are reported in Table   9 . The estimated relationships are similar across the two cohorts and align with those observed for the combined population. One difference, however, when the regressions are estimated by cohort, is that the coefficient of value-to-rent ratio is larger in absolute value for previous renters and statistically significant only for this cohort. This may reflect a stronger revealed preference for ownership among previous owners which causes them to be less sensitive to changes in the relative cost of owning to renting as measured by this ratio.
These results may be biased due to sample selection. identify target house values, thus, although the results (which are available from the authors) are supportive of the findings here, we do not include them. 21 We also replicate the instrumental variable models used in Calem et al. (2010) , using instruments for income and wealth to define the income and wealth constraints. The decrease in the impact of the credit constraint between 2007 and 2003 remains the same. 22 In one model we control for "only income constrained", "only credit constrained", "income or wealth constraint" and "all other constrained." In the other we control for each of the constraints individually and with interactions of credit with wealth and credit with income.
predicts the likelihood of homeownership likelihood. The estimated relationships of ownership status to the constraint indicators for both years are essentially unchanged.
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Finally, we test for whether the impact of credit constraints varies with housing market conditions by including interaction of the constraint indicators with an indicator of significant house price increase. We apply the 80 th percentile of three-year house price appreciation to distinguish high appreciation areas, as well as alternative thresholds. 24 We do this to test for whether greater relaxation of borrowing constraints is associated with high-appreciation areas. Tables 10 and 11 show results for three alternative specifications (models B1, B2, and B3) analogous to models A1, A2, and A3 in Tables 5 and 6 , distinguished by choice of variable to measure housing market conditions. Table 10 provides estimated coefficients and standard errors and Table 11 reports the marginal effects corresponding to the results in Table   10 .
We find that the credit quality constraint does not have a significant impact on homeownership in areas with high rates of house price appreciation in 2003, and by 2007, this variable is not statistically significant in either price appreciation category. The declining impact of the income constraint and relatively stability of the wealth constraint appears to be robust across the two price appreciation categories. We also interact constraints with the value-to-rent ratio with similar results.
These findings are broadly consistent with the earlier results without interaction terms.
However, the interaction effects for the credit quality constraint may provide some additional insight on evolution of lending practices in this period as discussed below.
c. Discussion
Overall, the model and its extensions establish the persistent significant impact of the wealth constraint and the declining impact of income and credit quality constraints during the The fact that the wealth constraint holds while the credit and income constraints weaken is consistent with lenders relying on collateral while easing other underwriting criteria. This result is agnostic as to whether rising house prices enabled greater reliance on collateral or whether relaxed credit constraints contributed to rising prices.
Even with greater reliance by lenders on collateral when easing other underwriting criteria, the persistence of the wealth constraint may seem surprising, since during this period as we have noted earlier, high-LTV "piggyback" lending, up to 100 percent combined LTV, became increasingly common. 25 Nevertheless, we can think of several additional reasons why the wealth constraint could remain binding. First, as described by Canner (2006, 2007) , a substantial proportion of the piggyback loans originated during this period were merely replacing first-lien loans with mortgage insurance which for many years had been a source of high-LTV financing. The piggybacks gained popularity as a lower cost (lower monthly payment) alternative to mortgage insurance, and as such would have contributed to reducing income constraints but not wealth constraints. Second, a substantial proportion of piggybacks were originated in the subprime market, expanding the availability of subprime credit, and thus helping to ease income and credit constraints. Third, even with 100 percent financing of the purchase price there still would be closing costs, moving costs, and fix-up costs for which the borrower would need disposable wealth.
Moreover, mitigating effects of piggyback lending on wealth constraints could have been offset by exacerbating effects of rapidly rising house prices. Such exacerbating factors include higher costs of a high LTV loan (which, in the case of a first and second lien would have a relatively high blended rate due to risk-based pricing. In addition, in an environment of rapidly appreciating house values, the asking price for the home might be higher than the appraised value, used to underwrite the loan, requiring the borrower to come up with the cash to close this "appraisal gap." Indeed, one might conclude that the surprising finding is not continued persistence of wealth constraints, but the banishment of income constraints despite 25 Some non-regulated non depository institutions did make second liens available which raised the CLTV up to 125% but such loans were not generally available and did not become common.
the rapid house price appreciation, which attests to the effectiveness of alternative mortgage products and less restrictive underwriting standards in mitigating income constraints.
We cannot identify the extent to which each of these potential mechanisms contributed to persistent wealth constraints. Nonetheless, this constraint holds and discourages excluding young individuals and immigrants. However, we do not view this as a significant drawback because our focus is on the evolving impact of borrowing constraints over the boom period and their interaction with local housing market conditions, which we expect would be similar for other demographic groups. Moreover, the NLSY sample of individuals 26 One possible explanation is the predominance of rapid house price growth during this period combined with the fact that mortgages from weaker housing markets could be packaged into MBS together with mortgages from markets with strong house price appreciation.
is likely less financially constrained than the excluded household categories, so any impact of constraints could be larger for the broader population.
Consistent with prior studies, the three constraint categories income, wealth, and credit quality are associated with reduced likelihood of homeownership among the recent movers in the 2003 wave of the NLSY, but only the impact of the wealth constraint persists in 2007.
These findings suggest that easing of lending standards during the boom period had a mitigating impact on income, and credit quality constraints to homeownership but not on the wealth constraint. Higher prices interacted with less strict underwriting standards so that wealth constraints were still an obstacle to homeownership.
Persistence of the wealth constraint may help explain why the homeownership rate declined during the boom period. The general increase in the proportion of borrowing constrained households consequent to rising house prices and the rise in the value-to-rent ratio could have further curtailed homeownership.
In the 2003 sample, we observe easing of the credit quality constraint in areas with relatively rapid house price appreciation, consistent with other studies that have found an association between rising house prices and less restrictive underwriting. As of 2007, we observe a general removal of credit quality and income constraints independent of geography, consistent with broad expansion of subprime and non-traditional mortgage credit. 
